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COMMENTS
which a business can maintain an action for trade name infringe-
ment should be immune from a similar attack by a charitable
organization, no other facts appearing.
In the principal case, where the plaintiff had all the interests
in its name which have been protected by the law of unfair com-
petition, and where there were present all the elements con-
sidered by modern courts as necessary to trade name protection,
together with a finding of fraudulent intent on the defendant's
part, the injunction was rightly granted.
TORTS--LESSOR'S LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTA-
TION TO LESSEE-PURPORTED OFFERS OF THIRD PERSONS
Lessors falsely represented to lessee that one Levine had of-
fered to lease the premises for more than twice the rent lessee
then was paying, and that, unless lessee signed a new lease at the
higher rental, lessors would evict lessee upon expiration of the
existing lease. Relying on this statement, lessee entered into a
new lease at the stipulated rental. Upon discovering the decep-
tion, lessee brought an action for fraud and deceit. Held: de-
fendant's demurrer to plaintiff's declaration sustained. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held: re-
versed and demurrer overruled. Such a false statement to a ten-
ant, coupled with a threat of eviction,' is an actionable misrepre-
sentation and not mere "seller's talk."
2
On these facts most jursidictions would find the defendants
liable for damages that plaintiff had suffered as a result of hav-
ing relied on lessors' statement.3 Massachusetts, however, has
consistently held that vendors' representations regarding pur-
ported offers by third persons were mere "sales talk" and not
1. It is interesting to note the emphasis the plaintiff's brief places on the
defendants' threat of eviction and the then existent (1946) shortage of
commercial rental premises in Boston. The presence of this duress rendered
the fraud constructed by the defendants a very thorough one. [Plaintiff's
brief, pp. 11-14.]
2. Kabatehnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corporation, 103 N.E.2d 692(Mass. 1952).
3. Baloyan v. Furniture Exhibition Bldg. Co., 258 Mich. 244, 241 N.W.
886 (1932); Brody v. Foster, 134 Minn. 91, 158 N.W. 824 (1916); Mon-
santo Chemical Works v. American Zinc, Lead, & Smelting Co., 253 S.W.
1006 (Mo. 1923); Isman v. Loring, 130 App. Div. 845, 115 N.Y. Supp. 933
(1st Dep't. 1909); Seaman v. Becar, 15 Misc. 616, 38 N. Y. Supp. 69 (Sup.
Ct. 1896); Caples v. Morgan, 81 Ore. 692, 160 Pac. 1154 (1916); Strick-
land v. Graybill, 97 Va. 602, 34 S.E. 475 (1899).
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actionable even though the falseness was intentional,4 the ration-
ale being that parties were to deal at arm's length and with in-
cipient distrust for each other. Paradoxically, during this same
period, Massachusetts courts deemed actionable other misrepre-
sentations which, it would appear, do not possess any greater
propensity to deceive than does the misrepresentation by a ven-
dor as to an offer by a third party. Some of these were that a
parcel of real estate yielded a certain amount of rent, that a stip-
ulated train schedule was in effect at the depot nearest the farm
being offered for sale,0 that the prospective purchaser of real
property was a manufacturer and a man of great wealth.7
Courts generally" have not found liability for a statement of
opinion9 as contrasted with a statement of material fact or a
statement of a fact particularly within the private knowledge of
the person weaving the falsity. However, as the court in the in-
stant case correctly perceives, the statement made by the defen-
dants, regarding a matter which was susceptible of their exact
knowledge at the time, was quite obviously arepresentation of a
purportedly existing fact. The existence or non-existence of Le-
vine's offer could have been ascertained during the trial. If the
falsity of the statement were established, the lessors would not
be immune from liability.
By so holding, the Massachusetts court has reversed its former
stand on vendors' intentional misstatements about offers made
by third parties. Thus Massachusetts is now in accord with the
trend of modern decisions which would allow recovery on these
facts.'0 Under this modern line of decisions, the doctrine of
caveat emptor, while not extinguished, has been narrowed. For
the type of misrepresentation here involved, Massachusetts will
now impose liability in tort for deceit, the other elements of the
4. Shikes v. Gabelnick, 273 Mass. 201, 173 N.E. 495 (1930); Common-
wealth v. Quinn, 222 Mass. 504, 111 N.E. 405 (1916); Boles v. Merrill, 173
Mass. 491, 53 N.E. 894 (1899); Cooper v. Lovering, 106 Mass. 77 (1870);
Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348 (Mass. 1853); Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete.
246 (Mass. 1843).
5. Exchange Realty v. Bines, 302 Mass. 93, 18 N.E.2d 425 (1939); Fol-
man v. Hamilburg, 300 Mass. 138, 14 N.E.2d 137 (1938) ; Brown v. Castles,
11 Cush. 348 (Mass. 1853).
6. Holst v. Stewart, 161 Mass. 516, 37 N.E. 755 (1894).
7. Commonwealth v. Quinn, 222 Mass. 504, 111 N.E. 405 (1916).
8. PRossnt, TORTS 745-758 (1941).
9. Id. at 754. Certain exceptions have been engrafted in the case of
statements of opinion.
10. Cases cited note 3, supra.
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action being present. It should be emphasized that the court ex-
pressly confines its opinion to this type of statement. Thus, with
respect to a large field of bargaining activities, a vendor may still
make intentionally false statements for which no action in deceit
will lie."
Present-day market-place morals are far from impeccable. By
reducing the number of occasions on which a vendor can, without
fear of liability, intentionally misrepresent a fact, courts en-
courage the prudent businessman to adhere to a higher ethic. 12
In turn, this raised ethic can have an expeditious effect on the
consummation of commercial affairs, for if parties can trust and
rely on the statements of each other, less time need be expended
for inquiries and verifications. The decision in the principal case
is a commendable one, for it moves in the direction of judicial
refutation of the malodorous saw that profits and morals are
antithetical concepts.
11. For a collection of cases illustrative of what modern courts categorize
as "sales talk," see 22 MiNN. L. Rnv. 939, 1004-1005 (1938).
12. One of Missouri's jurists has said that there exists in the law no rule
which holds man's heart prone to wickedness or which requires that man
must treat his fellow man as a thief or robber. Lamm, J., in Judd v. Walker,
215 Mo. 312, 114 S.W. 979, 981 (1908).
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